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Euro-Crisis: Law and Interdisciplinarity 
In December 2014 a conference “Euro-Crisis: Law and Interdisciplinarity” was held in the context of  
a three-year project “Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis law” funded by the EUI Research 
Council. This project intends to provide a comprehensive study of the effect of the crisis of the euro on 
national constitutional orders. In turn this study aims to offer a basis for further, especially 
comparative, studies of the legal status and implementation of legislative responses to the crisis at 
national level, the interactions between national legal systems and euro-crisis law, and the 
constitutional challenges that have been faced. The December conference brought together legal 
scholars and political scientists to reflect on the scope and limits of the legal discipline in reacting to 
the management of the crisis of the euro. Contributions were made on three topics: (1) how legal 
scholars have reacted to euro-crisis and the reforms adopted in its wake, with particular analysis of the 
main themes within legal scholarship on the issue; (2) whether and how other disciplines can help to 
understand and situate legal debates on euro-crisis; and (3) the relevance of the legal dimension for 
scholars from related social science disciplines such as political economy for their own perspective on 
euro-crisis and its policy consequences. 
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Abstract 
This paper analyses the literature produced by legal scholarship on the eurozone crisis. It addresses 
questions about the main substantive issues discussed, the methodological approaches taken, the level 
and nature of critical legal analyses, and the main legal and policy proposals based on legal 
scholarship research. The paper thus studies the nature of legal writings on the eurozone crisis. This 
paper builds on a large number of articles published between January 2009 and September 2014 in 
selected leading law journals and books. Most of them are written in English, but also French, 
German, Italian and Dutch publications are included. A further selection has been made of articles and 
books that have been made subject to an in-depth study. The main focus has been on publications that 
not only discuss individual aspects of the eurozone crisis (such as single legal instruments, case law, 
treaty articles or the impact on individual member states), but that (also) make a broader (critical) 
analysis of the changed nature of economic and monetary union or economic governance. 
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Research Question, Methodology and Scope of Research 
This paper analyses the literature produced by legal scholarship on the eurozone crisis. It addresses 
questions about the main substantive issues discussed, the methodological approaches taken, the level 
and nature of critical legal analyses, and the main legal and policy proposals based on legal 
scholarship research. These questions can be summarised in the following main research question: 
What is the nature of legal writings on the eurozone crisis? 
The paper builds on a large number of articles published between January 2009 and September 2014 
in selected leading law journals and books. Most of them are written in English, but French, German, 
Italian and Dutch publications are also included. For practical reasons – e.g. related to linguistic skills 
– the scope is currently limited. A list of all the selected publications can be found in Annex 1. 
A further selection has been made of articles and books that have been subjected to an in-depth study. 
The initial focus has been on publications that not only discuss individual aspects of the eurozone 
crisis (such as single legal instruments, case law, treaty articles or the impact on individual Member 
States), but that (also) make a broader (critical) analysis of the changed nature of economic and 
monetary union or economic governance. The scope of this in-depth study is currently expanding. 
In this paper I will do the following. I will first shortly introduce the main substantive issues discussed 
in legal scholarship writings on the eurozone crisis. I will then proceed with a discussion and 
illustration of the objectives of eurozone crisis legal writings. After that I will present a number of 
detailed and precise characterizations of the substantive and institutional changes to the economic and 
monetary union. Finally, I will discuss the nature of critical legal writings on the eurozone crisis based 
on fit and principle respectively. I will close with some concluding remarks. 
Main Substantive Issues Discussed 
There is an extensive body of legal scholarship literature on the eurozone crisis. Hardly any topic or 
angle seems to have been ignored. A great deal of attention is given to legality issues,1 democracy,2 
the case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht,3 and the Pringle case of the European Court of Justice.4 
                                                     
1 Athanassiou (2011), Bonke (2010), Calliess (2011), De Gregorio Merino (2012), Häde (2010), Hentschelmann (2011), 
Herrmann (2013), Kadelbach (2013), Louis (2010), Nettesheim (2011), Palmstorfer (2012), Palmstorfer (2014), Ruffert 
(2011b), Rugge (2013), Schwarz (2014), Smits (2012), Touri & Tuori (2014), Weber (2013), Wernsman & Zirkl (2014), 
Ziller (2012). 
2 CMLRev editorial (2012b), Chalmers (2012), Chiti (E). & Teixeira (2013), Dawson & De Witte (F.) (2013), Diamant & 
Van Emmerik (2011), Fasone (2014a), Habermas (2012), Kadelbach (2013), Menéndez (2013), Poiares Maduro (2012a), 
Ruffert (2011b), Schwarz (2014), Scicluna (2012), Tuori & Tuori (2014), Weber (2013), Weiler (2012), De Witte (B.), 
Héritier & Trechsel (eds.) (2013). 
3 Bardutzky & Fahey (2014), Bast (2014), Berner (2013), Beukers (2014b), Bonino (2013), Borger (2013b), Callies (2012b), 
Deters (2014), Eleftheriadis (2012), Di Fabio (2014), Faraguna (2011), Gärditz (2014), Gerner-Beuerle, Küçük & 
Schuster (2014), Goldmann (2014), Graf von Kielmansegg (2012), Kumm (2014), Luther (2012), Luther (2014), Mayer 
(2014), Müller-Graff (2012), Murswiek (2014), Pedrini (2013), Petersen (2014), Peuker (2013), Pliakos & Anagnostaras 
(2014), Recker (2011), Reestman (2013b), Rivosecchi (2014), Saulnier-Cassia & Joop (2013), Schiek (2014), Schmidt 
(2013), Schneider (2013), Schneider (2014), Schorkopf (2012), Thiele (2014a), Tuori&Tuori (2014), Von Ungern (2012), 
Vauchez (2012), Wendel (2013), Wendel (2014). 
4 Adam & Mena Parras (2013), Bardutzky & Fahey (2014), Beck (2013), Beck (2014), Borger (2013b), Coutron (2013), 
Craig (2013a), Craig (2014a), Haberkamm (2013), Hinarejos (2013), Koutrakos (2013), Van Malleghem (2013), 
Martucci (2013), Nettesheim (2013), Palmstorfer (2013), Thym & Wendel (2012), De Witte (B.) & Beukers (2013). 
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Surprising is the marginal attention that seems to exist for the relation between the eurozone crisis and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights,5 and the lack of extensive comparative research.6 
A further popular topic is the relationship between euro crisis law and individual Member States. 
Legal scholarship research focuses on the impact of euro crisis law on the legal system of specific 
Member States,7 the specific way a measure – in particular the Fiscal Compact – is implemented,8 or 
the specific limits encountered in the (constitutions of the) Member States.9 As mentioned above there 
has been considerable attention for the case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, not only in English 
and German, but also in French and Italian literature. To a lesser extent the case law of other bodies of 
constitutional review is also analysed, including that of the French Constitutional Council,10 the 
Portuguese Constitutional Court,11 the Estonian Supreme Court,12 the Spanish Constitutional 
Tribunal,13 the Italian Constitutional Court,14 and the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee (of 
Parliament).15 
Themes that have sparked particular interest are also institutional balance,16 differentiation,17 
solidarity,18 the social dimension of the crisis,19 and the relationship between law and integration.20 To 
a lesser extent this is also true of the ordoliberal origins of economic and monetary union,21 and the 
relationships between the eurozone crisis response and competition law,22 and between the crisis and a 
state of emergency.23  
                                                     
5 Exceptions are Barnard (2013), Costamagna (2014), and Kilpatrick (2014). 
6 Exceptions are Achtsioglou & Doherty (2014), Piedrafita (2014), Fasone (2014) and Reestman (2013). 
7 Achtsioglou & Doherty (2014), Leino-Sandberg & Salminen (2013a), MacMaoláin (2011), Moreiro Gonzalez (203), 
O’Gorman (2014b), Piedrafita (2014), Ruiz Almendral (2013). 
8 Boggero & Annicchino (2014), Cabras (2013), Diamant & Van Emmerik (2014), Fabbrini (2011), Gordon (2014), 
O’Gorman (2014a), Reestman (2013a), Reestman (2013c). 
9 Hinarejos (2012), Lorz & Sauer (2012), Nettesheim (2011), Pernice (2014), Varnes (2013). 
10 Reestman (2013b), Roux (2012). 
11 Cisotta & Gallo (2014), Fasone (2014b). 
12 Bardutzky & Fahey (2014), Ginter (2013), Reestman (2013b). 
13 Fasone (2014b). 
14 Fasone (2014b). 
15 Tuori & Tuori (2014). 
16 This includes the horizontal institutional balance at EU level, the vertical division of powers between the Union and the 
Member States, and the balance of powers within the Member States: Beukers (2013), Dawson & De Witte (F.) (2013), 
Fasone (2014a), Pitruzzella (2014), De Sadeleer (2012), Scicluna (2012). 
17 Including both internal and external differentiation: Cantore & Martinico (2013), Chiti (E.) & Teixeira (2013), Craig 
(2012), Craig (2013b), Fabbrini (2014a), Menéndez (2013), Messina (2014), Peers (2012), Peers (2013), Piris (2012), 
Schwarz (2014), Shuibhne (2011), De Witte (B.) (2012). 
18 Allemand (2012), Amtenbrink (2012), Bieber & Maiani (2012), Borger (2013a), Calliess (2011), Eijsbouts & Nederlof 
(2011), Habermas (2012), Häde (2010), Hentschelmann (2011), Potacs (2013), Pottakis (2011). 
19 Achtsioglou & Doherty (2014), Barnard (2013), Costamagna (2014), Schiek (2013), Kilpatrick (2014), Tuori & Tuori 
(2014) at 231, 235 and 238. 
20 Everson (2013), Joerges (2014), Menéndez (2013), Tuori & Tuori (2014), Wilsher (2014), De Witte (B.) (2012). 
21 Colliat (2012), Joerges (2014), Tuori & Tuori (2014). 
22 Exceptions are Baudenbacher & Bremer (2010), Ojo (2011) and Vogelaar (2009). 
23 Schorkopf (2011) at 341; Joerges (2014) at 997: “The Union experiences a state of emergency where the law is losing its 
integrity”; Fischer-Lescano (2014): “The European bodies and institutions are bound to comply with EU law even in the 
financial crisis. There is no state of emergency that suspends EU law.” 
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Objective of Eurozone Crisis Legal Writings 
Academic writings have different objectives, including explanation, prediction, and critical evaluation. 
Many social sciences, such as economics and political science, often have the objective of producing 
social laws that can predict future events. That is not the case for legal scholarship.  
The objective of legal scholarship research can be generally understood as both providing explanation 
and critical evaluation, often combined in a single publication. One approach taken to explanation and 
critical evaluation is that of analysing the ‘fit’ of a specific legal instrument (be it legislation, 
regulation or case law) with the existing legal system. A second approach often taken is that of 
explanation and critical evaluation of a legal instrument or state of affairs based on a specific higher 
principle. We can see both approaches also in eurozone crisis legal literature (see sections 5 and 6 
below). 
In this second approach the higher principle can in the first place follow from an ‘external’ 
philosophical exercise. Dawson & De Witte start their normative analysis of eurozone crisis law from 
the idea that “the stability and legitimacy of any political system requires the incorporation of 
individual and political self-determination”.24 Chalmers argues that a (redistributive) political system 
should internalise “conflicts on the grounds that they can be better mediated within collective 
structures and that they also can have many positive dimension.”25 A further illustration is provided by 
Joerges, who argues that: 
“Europe must find its constitutional form in a new type of “conflicts law,” which is characterized by 
two guiding principles. Firstly, the supranational European conflict of laws is to require Member 
States of the Union to take their neighbors’ concerns seriously—in this respect, it aims at 
compensating the structural democratic deficits of nation-statehood. Secondly, this European conflicts 
law should structure cooperative solutions to problems in specific areas—thereby reacting to the inter-
dependencies of modern societies.”26 
Secondly, it can also be taken ‘internally’ from the legal system. In the case of the European Union 
this can for example be the principle of democracy,27 the rule of law (both article 2 TEU),28 the 
principle of solidarity (article 3(3) TEU) or the principle of loyal cooperation (article 4(3) TEU).29 The 
resulting principle from both exercises may obviously be the same. 
As already stated, the relationship of legal scholarship with the future does not take the form of 
prediction on the basis of social laws, as is often the case with other social sciences, such as economics 
and political science. This does not mean that legal scholars are not concerned with the future. Several 
approaches can be identified in eurozone crisis legal writings. 
One approach includes making statements about the future sustainability or effectiveness of a 
particular state of affairs. With regard to the first, Scicluna e.g. argues that “Europe’s current politics 
of crisis resolution is putting democratic legitimacy under a level of pressure that is unlikely to be 
sustainable beyond the short term.”30 Joerges argues “The present state of the Union is unsustainable. 
The efforts to force Member States and their citizens into the straitjacket of new economic governance 
are bound to fail.”31 Adamski argues that “The euro area is doomed if national politics keeps 
                                                     
24 Dawson & De Witte (F.) (2013) at 817. 
25 Chalmers (2012) at 668. 
26 Joerges (2014) at 1026. 
27 For an example see Tuori & Tuori (2014) at 206. 
28 Joerges (2014) at 1001-1002. 
29 Calliess (2012a) at 106. 
30 Scicluna (2012) at 501. 
31 Joerges (2014) at 1025. 
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prevailing in the future (and almost certainly it will).”32 With regard to the second issue, the future 
effectiveness of both economic governance reform and of balanced budget rules has been studied.33 
Legal scholarship’s relationship with the future also takes the form of exploring and formulating 
possible future legal instruments. Examples abound of contributions about what has not (yet) been 
done with regard to the eurozone crisis. The option of an exit by a Member State from the euro area 
has been discussed by Hofmeister, Bonke, Meyer, Perry & Gelman, and Vila.34 The option of 
enhanced cooperation is explored by Wernsmann & Zirkl, and by Fabbrini with regard to the Financial 
Transaction Tax; by Messina with regard to the ESM and Fiscal Compact Treaties; and by Schwarz35 
for the ESM Treaty. Jacqué, Pernice and Duff all consider the option of a comprehensive treaty 
amendment, respectively providing reasons against treaty amendment (Jacqué), ideas for new 
provisions needed (Pernice), and a blueprint for a comprehensive treaty change (Duff).36 The 
compatibility and feasibility of possible future Eurobonds or mutualisation of debt has been 
investigated by many, including Allemand, Athanassiou and De Gregorio Merino.37 Beukers has 
explored opportunities and challenges of a euro area flexibility clause.38 Potteau considers the option 
of a euro-budget, Fabbrini of a fiscal capacity.39 
Furthermore, legal scholarship’s relationship with the future takes the form of formulating more 
general policy options and proposals. These can be presented in the form of different policy 
alternatives, discussing pros and cons of both. Hinarejos for example juxtaposes the Union’s choice 
between the two extremes of either a surveillance model or a classic fiscal federalism model in an 
attempt to create the ability to address structural asymmetries, and to prevent and counter asymmetric 
shocks.40 Piris extensively discusses four different choices for the Union. It could: substantially revise 
the treaties, continue on the present path while developing further closer cooperation, politically 
progress towards a two-speed Europe, or legally build a two-speed Europe.41 
Legal writings also take the form of an argument for a specific policy choice based on a normative 
position. Habermas famously argues that the Union should develop into a transnational democracy as 
opposed to the current state of post-democratic executive federalism.42 Poiares Maduro argues that 
financial solidarity in the EU must be detached from transfers between States and therefore proposes a 
sufficiently increased EU budget for preventing future crises, resulting from own resources, linked to 
EU generated wealth: economic activities that the EU enables and have mostly benefited from the 
internal market.43 Menéndez argues that what is needed is “a national rescue of the European Union, 
or what is the same, in realizing the democratic potential of national constitutions as the deep 
                                                     
32 Adamski (2012) at 1364. 
33 On effectiveness of economic goverance reform see Amtenbrink (2011), De Streel (2014). See on the effectiveness of 
balanced budget rules e.g. Diamant & Van Emmerik (2014), Van Malleghem (2014), and Papadopoulou (2014). 
34 Hofmeister (2011), Bonke (2010), Meyer (2013), Perry & Gelman (2013), Vila (2011). 
35 Wernsmann & Zirkl (2014), Fabbrini (2014a), Messina (2014), Schwarz (2014). 
36 Jacqué (2013), Pernice (2014), Duff (2013). 
37 Allemand (2012), Athanassiou (2011) at 571-573, De Gregorio Merino (2012) at 1630-1632 and 1642-1644. 
38 Beukers (2014a). 
39 Potteau (2013), Fabbrini (2014b). 
40 Hinarejos (2014). 
41 Piris (2012). Piris concludes at 147: “Since the best-suited option, that is, a substantive revision of the treaties, is excluded 
politically, the time is approaching when the choice will be between the status quo, which might mean a diluted EU, 
slowly stagnating and becoming irrelevant, and an EU that accepts, as a temporary measure, more differentiation between 
its Member States. (…) one has to try and find another feasible solution, in which the euro area countries should probably 
lead.” 
42 Habermas (2012). 
43 Poiares Maduro (2012a). 
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constitutional law of the European Union.”44 According to Chalmers, the redistributive EU political 
system needs a public law structure in which “conflicts take place only in those political arenas which 
form part of the wider EU legal settlement”, with arenas that have sufficient authority and in which all 
parties with a stake in the process are granted sufficient voice.45 
Explaining Change through Characterisation: The Changed Nature of Economic 
Governance/EMU 
The profound changes following from the response to the eurozone crisis to the Union in general, and 
to economic and monetary union in particular, have been described by legal scholarship as “a deep 
transformation of the European constitutional constellation”,46 “a process of mutation of European 
constitutional law”,47 a “constitutional mutation at the level of principles”,48 “a new institutional 
settlement”,49 and a “new constitutional balance”.50 Behind these general characterizations more 
detailed and precise characterizations of the substantive changes have been made, such as a shift from 
monetary stability to (also) financial stability, from a community of benefits to (also) a community of 
risk-sharing, from own responsibility to (also) solidarity, and the transformation of the Union into a 
political system redistributing significant wealth. More precise characterizations also exist of the 
institutional developments, including the Union method or new intergovernmental method as the 
default mode of crisis management, with closely related executive dominance, the new depolitised 
regulatory governance mechanisms, an undermined national budgetary sovereignty, and the 
autonomization of the euro area. 
Substantive Transformation 
From monetary to (also) financial stability 
The shift from monetary to (also) financial stability has been described by several authors. Tuori & 
Tuori argue that “the new position of financial stability as an overriding economic objective, explicitly 
confirmed in Pringle and the amendment to Art. 136 TFEU, is a central part of the constitutional 
mutation at the level of principles.”51 Borger for example, in his discussion of solidarity, notes that:  
“However, this strengthened solidarity of fact has triggered a change in normative solidarity between 
member states as well. Characteristic for this change is a departure from an economic policy that is 
predominantly focused on budgetary prudence and price stability to one that takes better into account 
financial stability as well.”52  
The new position of financial stability as an overriding economic objective is not only central to the 
new article 136(3) TFEU and the ESM Treaty: Wilsher also stresses the ECB’s emerging role to 
protect financial stability.53 
                                                     
44 Menéndez (2013) at 525. 
45 Chalmers (2012). 
46 Joerges (2014) at 999-1003. 
47 Menéndez (2013) at 511. 
48 Tuori & Tuori (2014) at 184. 
49 Chalmers (2012). 
50 Dawson & De Witte (F.) (2013) at 824. 
51 Tuori & Tuori (2014) at 184. 
52 Borger (2013a) at 16. 
53 Wilsher (2013) at 515. See also Beukers (2014b). 
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From a community of benefits to a community of (also) risk-sharing 
Chiti & Teixeira speak of a transformation of the EMU from a “community of benefits” to a 
“community of benefits and risk-sharing”.54 The financial assistance mechanisms are first step in the 
direction of a mutualisation among Member States of the costs connected to economic imbalances 
within the EMU. This transformation, which is not well-accomplished, represents “a potentially 
profound transformation of the overall rationale of the EMU.”55 Chiti & Teixeira argue that a further 
step in this direction could (and should) be the introduction of more advanced instruments of public 
debt mutualisation, such as the issuance of common debt.56 
From own responsibility to (also) solidarity (or: from crisis prevention to (also) crisis management) 
A central theme of research is the role played by solidarity, and the impact of the crisis on the 
development of solidarity in the Union. Much has been written about the meaning and effect of 
financial assistance on the principle of Member State fiscal responsibility expressed among others in 
the no-bailout principle, which for many underlies the Maastricht constitution of economic and 
monetary union. 
Whereas some have argued that article 125 TFEU is now an empty shell,57 others offer a more 
nuanced picture of the limits to Member States’ own responsibility: 
“(…) it would be overhasty to declare that this constitutional mutation would have made the principle 
of Member States’ fiscal responsibility moribund. The prohibition on bailouts in Art. 125(1) TFEU is 
still part of the macroeconomic constitution. However, through the constitutional complement of crisis 
prevention with crisis management, the scope of application of the prohibition has been restricted. It is 
only valid for good times but no longer for bad times. (…) The Pringle doctrine, confirmed by the 
amendment to Art. 136 TFEU, leaves the principle of Member State fiscal responsibility intact for 
other than crisis circumstances.”58 
Similarly, Potacs argues that although the ESM has reduced the scope of the principle of own State 
responsibility,59 it does not create a full-blown system change.60  
Some authors have focused on development of solidarity on the ground, generally considering the 
impact of the crisis to be negative. Amtenbrink argues that “It would be over-optimistic to conclude 
that the crisis has stimulated solidarity among Member States and compassion among citizens of the 
Union. In fact, the crisis may very well have had the opposite effect.”61 Tuori & Tuori argue that 
“Unfortunately, the crisis appears not to have brought European citizenry closer to but further 
distanced from the kind of solidaristic civic community which could act as the subject of European 
democracy.”62 Habermas is nonetheless optimistic, arguing that “There is nevertheless the expectation 
                                                     
54 Chiti (E.) & Texeira (2013) at 685. 
55 Chiti (E.) & Texeira (2013) at 699. 
56 Chiti (E.) & Texeira (2013) at 699. 
57 Palmstorfer (2013) at 222: “Pringle ist prima vista kein „Aufreger“ wie etwa das heftig kritisierte Mangold-Urteil. Dies 
kann nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass von Art. AEUV Artikel 125 Abs. AEUV Artikel 125 Absatz 1 AEUV nur mehr 
eine leere Hülle übriggeblieben ist. Die Bestimmung wurde entkernt, der gravierende Systemwandel weg von der 
haushaltspolitischen Eigenverantwortung hin zur Solidarität als unionsrechtskonform erachtet.“ 
58 Tuori & Tuori (2014) at 187. 
59 Potacs (2013) at 141: „Das Prinzip der staatlichen Eigenverantwortlichkeit wird damit ein gutes Stück zurückgenommen.“ 
60 Potacs (2013) at 143: „Eine grundlegende Systemänderung im Bereich des EU-Rechts wird durch den ESM allerdings 
noch nicht bewirkt.“ 
61 Amtenbrink (2012) at 187. 
62 Tuori & Tuori (2014) at 220. 
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that the growing mutual trust among the European peoples will give rise to a transnational, though 
attenuated, form of civic solidarity among the citizens of the Union.”63 
Focusing instead on the legal structure, and on normative solidarity, Borger sees a development from 
negative to positive solidarity in the establishment of temporary and permanent stability mechanisms 
that can provide financial assistance:  
“the solidarity between the members of the currency union has strengthened and even changed since 
the inception of EMU. (…) As a result of the strengthening of solidarity between euro area member 
states, Union law is put under strain. This forms the inevitable consequence of a treaty framework 
which is based on a notion of solidarity from the past.”64  
In contrast, Martucci argues with regard to the ESM that “De la solidarité, il n'est nulle trace; le MES 
n'est pas un mécanisme de solidarité, c'est un mécanisme au service de l'objectif supérieur de stabilité 
financière.”65 
Others emphasise the clear limits in the current legal framework.66 Potacs for example argues that 
“Eine weitgehende Aufgabe der staatlichen Eigenverantwortung zugunsten europäischer Solidarität 
würde eine Strukturänderung der EU mit einer staatsrechtlichen Dimension von bisher nicht 
gekanntem Ausmaß bedeuten“.67 Bieber & Maiani argue that “L'épicentre de ces crises est la Grèce, 
mais leur origine réside, en amont, dans un cadre constitutionnel ou légal empêchant l'affirmation de 
l'intérêt commun et le développement d'une action réellement solidaire.”68 
The Union as a redistributive political system 
Chalmers identifies a European distributive State.69 Dawson & De Witte speak of a new constitutional 
balance, and argue that the euro crisis has led to a paradigm change, from direct legislative influence 
in distributive policies being both legally and politically off-limits for the Union institutions, to “a total 
disregard of both the legal and constitutional limitations to transnational cooperation.”70 Hinarejos is 
more cautious and considers that the particular pattern of fiscal integration in the EU up to the 
eurozone crisis, namely that Member States are willing to go further on so-called balance rules (rules 
that concern budgetary discipline and balance) than on substantive rules (that concern the allocation of 
resources within a State and thus have a distributive or redistributive effect) has not changed.71 
                                                     
63 Habermas (2012) at 29. 
64 Borger (2013a) at 9. Also at 12: “As to the factual/normative distinction, the treaty framework on EMU symbolizes and 
expresses both the factual and normative solidarity existing in the currency union. The most basic and visible form of 
factual solidarity, the interlocking of exchange rates (…). The normative dimension to the solidarity between the 
members of the currency union becomes clearly visible from several provisions referring to price stability, the Union’s 
main monetary policy goal, as well as sound public finances. As to the negative/positive distinction, the negative 
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TFEU.” 
65 Martucci (2013). 
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Institutional Transformation 
Tuori & Tuori summarise the institutional transformation of the euro area as follows: 
“The federalist structures which the crisis has gradually engendered are largely based on 
intergovernmentalism, supported by expertise-based institutions, such as the Commission and the 
ECB.”72 
Chiti & Teixeira also capture different elements of the institutional transformation when they argue 
that: 
“(...) the increasing involvement of the EU executive power in fiscal matters takes place mainly through 
quasi-automatic procedures, so that the erosion of national fiscal sovereignty is not accompanied by the 
emergence of a genuine political action at the EU level.”73 
Union method, intergovernmentalism, executive dominance 
Adamski argues that all crisis measures essentially follow the same intergovernmental governance 
paradigm.74 Joerges argues that “the resort to the ‘Union method’ amounts to a deep transformation of 
the European constitutional constellation”.75 In fact, several authors have noticed the prominence of 
the Union method in the crisis, summarised by Chiti & Teixeira as “the inter-dependence and 
interaction between Community and intergovernmental instruments within the EU, in the multiple and 
complex forms envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty.”76 Chiti & Teixeira argue however that the reality of 
the EU responses to the crisis has not just been that of the traditional Union method envisaged by the 
Lisbon Treaty, but that these responses “have been worked out mainly through mechanisms 
minimizing the role and function of the Community channels and based on a specific form of 
coordination of national governments.”77 In other words, they discern a “move from the Union method 
to a new form of intergovernmentalism.”78 The Euro Summit best embodies this approach: “In the 
elaboration of the European responses to the crisis, thus, a crucial role has been played by an 
intergovernmental body composed only of the EU Member States participating in the euro area, 
external to the Treaty institutional framework, interacting with other intergovernmental bodies and 
insulated from the possible influence of the non-intergovernmental EU political institutions.”79  
Kadelbach identifies a power shift towards the executive.80 Craig argues that although in terms of 
process there is some evidence of the Schmittian perspective in the lead that has been taken by the 
European Council (“power being concentrated to an ever-greater extent in the EU executive, the 
rationale being that only it can respond with sufficient speed to the profound problems generated by 
 
                                                     
72 Tuori & Tuori (2014) at 217. 
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the euro crisis”), in terms of substance, “it may well prove to be the Commission within the EU 
executive whose power is most enhanced.”81 At the national level, Piedrafita finds “the weakness of 
the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs in Spain (despite the new Lisbon provisions), as well as the 
strong position of the executive in the political system.”82 
Macroeconomic governance: Regulatory regime, non-representative institutions, and surveillance 
The new economic governance has been described (and criticised) by Chalmers as a new institutional 
settlement of co-government on balanced budgets, deficits and macroeconomic imbalances,83 and a 
system that “transfers the machinery and thinking of the regulatory State to questions of 
redistribution.”84 Menéndez argues that most of the new powers transferred beyond the State “are to be 
exercised within the Union through decision-making powers in which non-representative institutions 
have either the last word or massive influence.”85 Chiti & Teixeira note that “In the transfer from the 
national to the EU level, in other terms, fiscal matters have been depoliticized and insulated from the 
realm of politics.”86 Van der Sluis argues that the euro crisis measures give new attributes to the 
constitutionalisation of budgetary restraints.87 Delledonne notices a shift from a prevailing political to 
a would-be legal notion of financial constitutions,88 and a corrosion of political decision-making at the 
national level as a consequence of the Fiscal Compact.89 Reestman identifies a tendency towards 
depolitisation and legalisation in the Fiscal Compact.90 
Armstrong argues that the changes to EU economic governance have to be understood as consisting of 
hybrid normative grids and accountability frameworks, including both rule-based and co-ordination-
based governance techniques.91 Hinarejos considers EMU to be in the initial phase of the surveillance 
model and identifies a “trend towards increasingly detailed and enforceable prescriptions from the 
centre.”92 Developing towards a classic fiscal federalism model would mean giving the Union the 
necessary resources to address structural inequalities and prevent asymmetric shocks, but in practice 
even a cautious development in this direction is politically unlikely in the short term.93  
Limited national sovereignty and budgetary autonomy 
Legal scholars take fundamentally different positions on the impact of euro crisis law on national 
sovereignty and budgetary autonomy. It is useful always to keep in mind the very different regimes 
applying to Member States receiving financial assistance on the one hand, and the general 
macroeconomic governance regime applying to all (with admittedly further reaching rules for 
eurozone Member States) on the other hand, something which is not always done. 
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Calliess is illustrative of one extreme position on the sovereignty and autonomy of Member States 
receiving financial assistance: 
“An over-indebted Member State ultimately can only choose between a sovereign default and the 
recourse to emergency state aids from the ESM. The recipient State therefore autonomously agrees to 
a limitation of its budgetary sovereignty, when deciding to receive conditional emergency aids from 
the ESM. (…) Against this background, a budgetary veto right on the EU level regarding the 
respective national draft budget can hardly be assessed as an interference with the parliament’s budget 
sovereignty; when the only alternative is a sovereign default, the budgetary sovereignty has already 
been lost.”94 
Tuori & Tuori by contrast argue that “With their reference to strict conditionality, Pringle and the 
amendment to Art. 136 TFEU have made explicit the constitutional status of the curtailment of 
sovereignty which beneficiary States must accept as a price for financial assistance.”95 
Calliess similarly downplays the impact of the general economic governance framework on budgetary 
sovereignty: “National budgetary sovereignty is maintained as the Commission neither has a veto right 
regarding national budgetary planning nor is the fiscal treaty’s debt brake a significant innovation 
(…).”96 Many authors take a different position here.97 Tuori & Tuori for example argue that “Another 
characteristic of the incrementalist reinforcement of European economic governance has been 
increased intrusion into the procedural and substantive budgetary autonomy of the Member States.”98 
Diamant and Van Emmerik argue this in detail with regard to the Dutch Parliament, whose formal 
budgetary powers are undermined by European measures, and also contend that the measures taken to 
strengthen and improve economic and monetary cooperation in the EU limit the political opportunities 
to shape the budget nationally.99 
Differentiation and autonomization of the EMU 
Chiti & Teixeira argue that one of the main implications of the recourse to composite arrangements is  
“the legal and institutional differentiation of the EMU from the EU as a whole, as well as, within the 
EMU itself, in the differentiation of the euro countries from the other EMU members.”100  
Menéndez argues that:  
“the centralization of power has come hand in hand with the two phenomena that challenge the 
integrity of European Union law: the Eurozone has affirmed its autonomous institutional identity vis-
                                                     
94 Calliess (2012a) at 117. 
95 Tuori & Tuori (2014) at 189. 
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mutation at the European level has had with regard to Member State constitutions concern the budgetary autonomy of the 
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à-vis the European Union at large; and (b) Union law has been an attempt at escaping Union law by 
means of a relapse into intergovernmental law.”101 
Nature of Critical Legal Writings: Fit 
“Lawyers—practitioners and academics alike—have all traditionally sought to remain on good terms 
with political power. When it comes to Articles 122–126 TFEU, our discipline can apparently not 
resist helping political and institutional actors by taking the letter of the law so lightly as to run afoul 
of it.”102 
This statement by Joerges could be interpreted as a serious accusation of incapability to assess the fit 
of euro crisis instruments with important treaty articles. But is it true? Looking at the many 
contributions by legal scholarship I would say it is not. 
It is true that there is a considerable number of authors that can be seen as permissive of the legal 
forms that the political, monetary, and judicial response to the eurozone crisis has taken. With regard 
to the political reaction of providing financial assistance, De Gregorio Merino for example argues that 
article 122(2) TFEU grants the Council a very wide margin of discretion to decide on assistance,103 
and that article 125(1) TFEU does not prohibit types of financial assistance, such as loans or credits 
where the beneficiary of the assistance is held to pay them back.104 Athanassiou argues that both a 
literal, teleological and a contextual interpretation of article 125 leads to the conclusion that the 
prescribed ban was not intended as an absolute one.105 Häde similarly argues that “Allerdings haben 
die Parteien des Vertrags von Maastricht das Haftungsverbot des heutigen Art. 125 AEUV schon von 
vornherein nicht ausnahmslos erlassen”106 and that “Die Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung für 
Griechenland und im Rahmen des europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus sind als letzte Mittel zum 
Schutz der Euro-Währung und der Wirtschaft der Mitgliedstaaten zulässig.”107 Smits argues that “The 
evolved interpretation of the no-bail out clause, which bars other Member States from assuming the 
debt of a fellow State but does not bar them from assisting the latter in repaying its own debts, is 
appropriate.”108 
With regard to the specific form chosen for the political response, namely that of the 
intergovernmental Fiscal Compact and ESM treaties outside the EU legal framework, permissive 
voices can also be found. Calliess argues that “(…) the Member States are thus free to enter further 
international obligations, which go beyond economical and budgetary obligations based on EU 
law.”109 Chiti & Teixeira argue that “From the legal point of view (…) the recourse to composite 
arrangements may be considered, in principle, a legitimate option.”110 According to De Witte and 
Beukers “if Member States have preserved the competence to make domestic law in a given area, they 
can logically also exercise that competence together, by concluding an international agreement 
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between themselves. These agreements should not, however, contain institutional or substantive 
provisions that are incompatible with specific norms of EU law.”111 Also on the unique combining of 
EU legal instruments and international treaties to facilitate financial assistance, Weber argues that: 
“Der Mix aus Handlungsformen der sog. Gemeinschaftsmethode, also des unmittelbar anwendbaren 
Gemeinschafsrechts, einerseits wie des intergouvernementalen Handelns durch 
unionsvölkerrechtliche Verträge und Ratseinschlieβungen andererseits, ergibt ein komplexes 
rechtliches Bild, das im Sinne der dienenden Funktion des Rechts zur Bewältigung von Notsituationen 
vertretbar erscheint.”112 
With regard to the monetary reaction, Wilsher argues that “The ECB cannot seriously be accused of 
having broken any rule of law within the Maastricht Treaty through its reluctant and conditional 
actions during the crisis.”113 Athanassiou has argued that “as a matter of law, the SMP is consistent 
with the rationale and objective of the monetary financing prohibition”.114 According to Petch “there is 
currently no basis for challenging the legality of OMTs under EU law.”115 Borger argues that 
“Although certainly unconventional in nature, the bond-buying activities of the ECB seem to stay 
within its monetary policy competences and not to violate the prohibition on monetary financing.”116 
Smits considers also the ECB’s collateral policy to be in line with its mandate: “In my reading of the 
law, the ECB certainly acts within the limits of the law when accepting bonds issued by ‘downgraded’ 
Member States.”117 
With regard finally to the judicial reaction, De Witte & Beukers have argued “(a)ll in all, the Court has 
given, in Pringle, a well-reasoned judgment expressing a good mixture of legal principle and political 
pragmatism.”118 Also on Pringle, Craig has argued that: 
“It might be argued, as Beck does, that the CJEU crossed the line between legal argumentation and 
political decision. I do not accept this, even if one chooses to defend the result on the more overtly 
teleological ground. That approach remains defensibly legal for the reasons set out above, and this is 
so even though it is contestable. It might also be argued that courts should exclude consequentialist 
considerations when considering the legal ambit of Treaty provisions. I do not accept this either.”119 
But critical authors as to fit can equally be found. With regard to the political response to the crisis, 
Ruffert has argued that “(f)rom the beginning, the Member States’ rescuing activity has been under 
close legal scrutiny by European legal scholars, and rightly so. There are good reasons to submit that 
this policy is in breach of important provisions of the TFEU.”120 Palmstorfer has similarly argued that 
both the EFSF and the ESM emergency funds are in violation of the no-bailout clause of article 125 
TFEU, to which he prefers to give a broad interpretation prohibiting all forms of financial assistance 
given by the European Union or through a Member State to another.121 According to Sester. 
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the ESM violates, at least, the spirit of article 125 TFEU.122 Adamski argues that “It is dubious (…) if 
Article 122(2) TFEU could ever be a proper legal basis for the EFSM Regulation in the first place.”123 
Tomkins argues that: 
“(…) the accumulation of contradictions with and circumventions of the Union legal order gives the 
impression that, taken as a whole, the legal framework governing the ESM avoids a number of 
prohibitions and obligations set out in law.”124 
Palmstorfer has also questioned the legality of parts of the so-called six-pack of economic governance 
measures, arguing with regard to reversed qualified majority voting (RVM) that “the EP and the 
Council were not competent to introduce RMV. For these reasons, RMV as introduced by the ‘six 
pack’ is a measure that contravenes the legal framework of the Treaties.”125 Equally critical of the six-
pack is Ruffert: 
“Some of the measures to achieve convergence and budgetary control are highly doubted in EU legal 
terms, though in a less spectacular way than those to react to financial emergency. Few scholars would 
argue that Article 121(4) TFEU covers the sanctions – fines or deposits –contained in parts of the 
reform package, in particular, if the provision is compared with the elaborate mechanism of sanctions 
in Article 126 TFEU. It is also extremely questionable to modify Treaty rules on voting procedures as 
do some of the regulations within the package.”126 
The legality of the specific way in which international treaties have been concluded as part of the 
political eurozone crisis response has also been questioned. Craig is critical of the conferral on EU 
institutions of new functions by a Treaty such as the Fiscal Compact, arguing that it is contrary to the 
Lisbon Treaty for both procedural and substantive reasons.127 Dimopoulos argues that: 
“As the ESM and the Fiscal Compact introduce international law obligations in an area covered 
largely by EU law, it is at least questionable as to how these international agreements fit within the 
existing EU legal framework, and if they are in conformity with EU law.”128 
With regard to the monetary policy reaction, the ECB has been criticised by Ruffert for the rather 
weak basis of its security markets programme (SMP).129 Tuori & Tuori are also critical of the ECB’s 
sovereign bond purchases.130 
With regard to the main European judicial reaction, that of the ECJ in Pringle, Beck argues that 
“(…) the Court exploits, to the maximum extent, the vagueness and norm uncertainty in its general 
approach to legal reasoning, and probably to a point where legal reasoning no longer imposes any 
constraints on judicial making.”131 
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In sum, the compatibility of the ESM with article 125 TFEU, of the ECB’s action with its mandate and 
the monetary policy prohibition of article 123 TFEU, of the conclusion of intergovernmental treaties 
in general with Union competences, and of the six-pack with the Union competences in article 121 and 
126 TFEU have all been questioned by legal scholars. In other words, the ‘fit’ of the European 
political, monetary and judicial response to the eurozone crisis with EU law has been scrutinised. If 
anything has been taking lightly by European legal scholarship in their analysis of EU law, it may be 
the spirit of the law, not so much its letter. 
Nature of Critical Legal Writings: Principle 
“In this sense, all these challenges, difficulties or even insurmountable obstacles notwithstanding, as 
an academic discipline European Union law cannot remain silent or reluctant but must actively 
participate in the assessment of the current crisis and in evaluating the instruments proposed and 
enacted to overcome it.”132 
Many of the characteristics identified by legal scholarship on the eurozone crisis at the same time have 
been considered problematic: the use of intergovernmental treaties, the use of the Union or 
intergovernmental method as opposed to the Community method, the use of a regulatory system at EU 
level for decision making with redistributive effects, executive dominance and the undermining the 
(budgetary) powers of national parliaments. These elements are perceived as at tension with 
fundamental principles, including democracy, unity, solidarity, and social values. 
Democracy 
There seems to be general agreement among legal scholars as to the many democratic problems 
associated with the response to the eurozone crisis. On the solutions proposed, however, there is quite 
some divergence. 
 Several authors are preoccupied with the implications of executive dominance for democracy. Tuori 
& Tuori argue that:  
“First, executive participation in European policy-making should be subjected to constant supervision 
by national parliaments and civil societies. And second (…) should contribute to rather than destroy 
the socio-cultural prerequisites for European democracy. Arguably, the new intergovernmentalism 
meets neither of these preconditions.”133  
Chiti & Teixeira similarly note that:  
“(...) the increasing involvement of the EU executive power in fiscal matters takes place mainly 
through quasi-automatic procedures, so that the erosion of national fiscal sovereignty is not 
accompanied by the emergence of a genuine political action at the EU level. In the transfer from the 
national to the EU level, in other terms, fiscal matters have been depoliticized and insulated from the 
realm of politics. (...) without being on their turn based on clear new mechanisms of democratic 
legitimation.”134 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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According to Menéndez:  
“(…) very significant new powers have been transferred to the supranational level of government; 
(…) most of these new powers are to be exercised within the Union through decision-making powers 
in which non-representative institutions have either the last word or massive influence. This is 
something that is not only problematic from a general democratic perspective, but also from the 
perspective of the preservation of institutional balance within the Union—a fundamental channel of 
transmission of democratic legitimacy from Member States to the Union. (…) the reform of the 
economic governance of the Eurozone implies a serious challenge to the structural room for 
democratic decision-making on what concerns fiscal policy, and, more generally, economic policy.”135  
Dawson & De Witte state that: 
“The loss of the citizens’ voice is not only reflected in the diminishing capacity of the EP and national 
parliaments, but also in the increasing tendency in EU policy towards informalisation. Such 
informalisation may not only lead to executive dominance, but inhibit individual and political self-
determination by excluding the degree of transparency and consultation necessary for the genuine 
involvement of citizens in EU decision-making to take place.”136 
Some authors criticise in particular the anti-democratic nature of the ESM Treaty. According to 
Ruffert: 
“Consequently, the establishment of democratically doubtful institutional arrangements should ignite 
the warning lights. As may be shown, parliamentary control and political accountability towards the 
European Parliament is non-existent in the ESM, and it is substantially diminished with respect to 
national parliaments as in all similar institutional structures at the international level. Usually, such 
limitation of parliamentary influence, debate and participation is justified by a high measure of 
expertise and objectivity, institutionally anchored, above all, in the Commission, but in the given 
context also in the ECB or – in other instances – in agencies. In terms of theory and practice of 
democracy, such compensation may already be considered as doubtful, but what is scarcely acceptable 
is the replacement – in a field of exclusive EU competence! – of parliamentary decision and 
independent expertise by the opaque processes of Council or even Heads of State or Government 
negotiations.”137 
Much less convergence exists on the solutions to the democratic challenges of the Union. While 
Habermas proposes a transnational democracy as the solution to the democratic problems of the 
current Union,138 Scicluna instead argues that “democracy is still best preserved by sovereign States 
within more limited EU.”139 And whereas Weiler argues that “at what will be a decisive moment in the 
evolution of the European construct, the importance, even primacy of the national communities as the 
deepest source of legitimacy of the integration project will be affirmed yet again,”140 Maduro cautions 
against such a position, arguing that “a model that would make EU democracy wholly or 
fundamentally dependent on national democracies is destined to fail.”141 
                                                     
135 Menéndez (2013) at 511. 
136 Dawson & De Witte (F.) (2013) at 834. 
137 Ruffert (2011b) at 1790. See also Tomkins (2013) at 180: “Third, the establishment and operation of an important 
institution outside the constitutional framework of the Union and beyond the reach of its citizens (and the rights they are 
guaranteed under the Charter) is inconsistent with the principle of democratic governance. Each of these arguments will 
be considered in turn.” 
138 Habermas ( 2012). 
139 Scicluna (2012) at 501. 
140 Weiler (2012) at 837. 
141 Poiares Maduro (2012a) at 14. 
Thomas Beukers 
16 
Unity 
Several authors see the response to the eurozone crisis as a threat to the principle of unity of the 
Union. Tuori & Tuori argue that “Pringle confirmed intergovernmental agreements as the third option, 
alongside enhanced cooperation and use of Art. 136, which is available for establishing a particular 
Eurozone regime and retreating further from the principle of unity of the Union.”142 Chiti & Teixeira 
warn that “Pointing to the autonomization of the EMU is of particular importance because this process 
may have the effect of weakening the legal and institutional unity of the EU.”143 According to 
Menéndez:  
“The codification of a legally differentiated treatment of Member States (different sets of rights and 
obligations are emerging for Eurozone states and non-Eurozone states, and for creditor/surplus states 
and debtor/deficit states) represents a major challenge to the principle of equality between Member 
States (and not so indirectly, of citizens). The second reason why we should bother concerns the depth 
of the changes. (…) After rather abstract talk about differentiated integration in the last two decades, 
we woke up, and inequality among Member States started to be legally codified (…)”144 
Solidarity 
Authors disagree on the meaning of the principle of solidarity binding the Union. Several authors 
stress its place as an exception in Union law. Ruffert argues that: 
“There is no doubt about the character of solidarity as a principle of the EU, and it is submitted that it 
has a clear position within the economic field. Solidarity is achieved via a cohesion policy and 
structural funds, via regional projects and within the Common Agricultural Policy. In these areas, the 
Transfer Union already exists, and it should operate for the mutual benefit of receiving countries and 
paying countries alike – the latter in support of their exporting industries. There is, however, no legal 
basis for further capital transfers, and in the EMU the express provision of Article 122(2) TFEU does 
not only reflect the principle of solidarity but also brings it into concrete shape in cases of distress of 
national economies. The provision clearly describes the scope of Member States’ solidarity, and it is 
necessary that the institutions explicitly rely on it when formulating a rescue package. What is more, 
the motives for the creation of the rescue packages are by no means related to solidarity alone, 
considering the effects on the banking sector.”145 
Potacs also sees a limited scope of a possible Union solidarity obligation, arguing that if such 
obligation is to be found among Member States in article 3 EU Treaty, then it can be interpreted only 
as an obligation to show budgetary discipline.146 
Pottakis, however, sees a much more prominent place for a legal solidarity principle in the Union: 
“(…) that fundamental principles underpinning the EU construction seem to be blatantly undermined, 
if not directly threatened: solidarity, which, since the Treaty of Lisbon, has been upgraded from a 
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notion underpinning the political philosophy of the European project to a binding principle of 
increased, constitutional value and weight, is being applied in ways that hardly fit to even its most 
unconventional interpretation.”147 
Interestingly, Calliess sees a role for the solidarity principle justifying assistance measures and 
interpreting article 125 TFEU, and considers the solidarity principle to also be based in the loyalty 
principle.148 Potacs, however, clearly disagrees: 
“Hingegen ist weder aus der Formulierung noch aus dem Zweck von Art. 4 Abs. 3 EUV abzuleiten, 
dass diese Vorschrift unionsrechtliche Gebote einschränken soll. Aus diesem Grund lässt sich mit 
dieser Bestimmung auch nur schwer ein allgemeines unionsrechtliches Solidaritätsprinzip begründen, 
das die in den Art. 123 ff. AEUV klar gebotene staatliche Eigenverantwortlichkeit relativieren 
könnte.”149 
Social values 
Criticism takes place at two levels here. Several authors criticise the constitutionalisation of a specific 
policy, that of austerity or of conditionality. At the same time authors criticise the imbalance between 
the Union’s economic constitution and its social constitution. Dawson & De Witte argue that: 
“Despite the economic reasoning behind austerity policies, the legal entrenchment of such policies is 
neither the result of inter-personal political exchanges between different visions of ‘the good’, or a 
process of open political contestation that could legitimise it, nor an attempt to set up mechanisms for 
future normative reassessment. This is, rather, the constitutionalisation of raw political power and 
temporary policy preferences.”150  
Costamagna argues that:  
“(…) recipes have paid little attention to the effects that these reforms may have on fundamental 
social objectives that lie at the core of the EU social dimension. Such a one-sided approach touches 
upon one of the essential prerequisites for the legitimacy of the whole integration process, as it fails to 
strike a proper balance between the pursuit of economic objectives and the safeguard of the European 
social dimension.”151  
Schiek derives a constitution of social governance from the EU’s values and proposes that the Court of 
Justice develops its case law into an instrument for challenging the dominance of the EU’s economic 
governance constitution.152 Tuori & Tuori capture both levels of criticism in their statement that:  
“(…) market-liberal economic reason has conspicuously overruled the European social constitution. 
With the constitutionalisation of strict conditionality and its interpretation in a market-liberal spirit, 
the social constitution once more proved to be the loser, now in relation to the macroeconomic 
constitution.” 
                                                     
147 Pottakis (2011) at 181. 
148 Calliess (2011). 
149 Potacs (2013) at 140. 
150 Dawson & De Witte (F.) (2013) at 826. 
151 Costamagna (2014) at 377. 
152 Schiek (2013). 
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Final Remarks 
Clearly there is an extensive body of legal scholarship literature on the eurozone crisis. Early writings 
that have functioned as point of a reference for many later works are Louis (2010), Calliess (2011) and 
Ruffert (2011b). It seems to be impossible to find anyone in praise of the legal creativity part of the 
political, monetary and judicial response to the eurozone crisis. Instead, legal scholars have criticised – 
sometimes heavily153 – this response from different angles, albeit more on the basis of principle than 
of fit. In its critical discussion of the response to the eurozone crisis, legal scholarship seems to engage 
more with political theory than with economic theory.154 
 
                                                     
153 Dawson & De Witte (F.) (2013), Joerges (2013), Menéndez (2014). 
154 A notable exception is Tuori & Tuori (2014). 
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